突发事件下回馈与惩罚契约协调的风险厌恶闭环供应链研究

针对突发事件影响产品的销售价格和再制造品的回收价格、新产品的制造成本和再制造品的再制造成本等发生扰动的情况,本文引入条件风险值(conditional value at risk-CVaR)刻画随机需求下单一风险厌恶型的零售商和单一风险中性的制造商组成的闭环供应链模型,探讨了突发事件发生前后基于订货量与实际回收量的回馈与惩罚 (orders rebate and penalty- recycles rebate and penalty, ORP-RRP)契约能否实现风险厌恶闭环供应链的协调问题。计算机仿真分析表明：突发事件造成新产品和再制造产品的价格与成本同时发生扰动时,新的ORP-RRP契约能够实现突发事件发生后风险厌恶闭环供应链的协调。最后通过数值算例验证了相关结论和契约的有效性。

Risk averse closed-loop supply chain coordination mechanism with rebate and penalty contracts under emergency

In the case of the emergency events causes the manufacturing cost, the remanufacturing cost, selling price and recycling price disrupted at the same time, a closed-loop supply chain model composed of a single risk-neutral supplier and a single risk-averse retailer is proposed based on Conditional Value-at-Risk(CVaR) criterion and demand uncertainty, and then whether ORP-RRP(orders rebate and penalty- recycles rebate and penalty) contracts could realize the closed-loop supply chain coordination and optimization before and after emergency events are discussed. Several computer simulations experiments show that when the manufacturing cost, the remanufacturing cost, selling price and recycling price performs disturbance simultaneously, new ORP-RRP contracts can coordinate closed-loop supply chain with risk aversion after emergency events. At last, we use numerical examples to verify the correctness of related conclusions and the effectiveness of the contacts.