Security analysis of two recently proposed RFID authentication protocols |
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Authors: | Chao Lv Hui Li Jianfeng Ma Meng Zhao |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Electrical Engineering, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, 90095-1594, USA;(2) Computing Science Department/DS group, Radboud University Nijmegen, 6525 Nijmegen, AJ, The Netherlands;(3) ESAT-COSIC, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium |
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Abstract: | Radio frequency identification (RFID) systems suffer many security risks because they use an insecure wireless communication channel between tag and reader. In this paper, we analyze two recently proposed RFID authentication protocols. Both protocols are vulnerable to tag information leakage and untraceability attacks. For the attack on the first protocol, the adversary only needs to eavesdrop on the messages between reader and tag, and then perform an XOR operation. To attack the second protocol successfully, the adversary may execute a series of carefully designed challenges to determine the tag’s identification. |
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