The impact of fuzziness in social choice paradoxes |
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Authors: | Javier Montero |
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Affiliation: | (1) Faculty of Mathematics, Complutense University, Madrid, Spain |
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Abstract: | Since Arrow’s main theorem showed the impossibility of a rational procedure in group decision making, many variations in restrictions
and objectives have been introduced in order to find out the limits of such a negative result. But so far all those results
are often presented as a proof of the great expected difficulties we always shall find pursuing a joint group decision from
different individual opinions, if we pursue rational and ethical procedures. In this paper we shall review some of the alternative
approaches fuzzy sets theory allows, showing among other things that the main assumption of Arrow’s model, not being made
explicit in his famous theorem, was its underlying binary logic (a crisp definition is implied in preferences, consistency,
liberty, equality, consensus and every concept or piece of information). Moreover, we shall also point out that focusing the
problem on the choice issue can be also misleading, at least when dealing with human behaviour. |
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Keywords: | Fuzzy preferences Group decision making Social choice |
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