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| 工程安全监理的博弈分析 | |
| 引用本文： | 鹿中山,杨树萍,杨善林.工程安全监理的博弈分析[J].建筑科学,2012(1):100-103. |
| 作者姓名： | 鹿中山 杨树萍 杨善林 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 合肥工大建设监理有限责任公司,合肥230009;合肥工业大学土木建筑工程学院,合肥230009 2. 合肥工业大学土木建筑工程学院,合肥,230009 3. 合肥工业大学管理学院,合肥,230009 |
| 摘 要： | 在博弈论的框架下对工程安全监理进行了分析,首先给出博弈分析的基本假设,然后分析了阶段博弈和重复博弈模型,得到博弈分析的均衡战略,指出承包商为了其经济利益而进行安全不投入,希望通过侥幸而不出现安全事故这种现象不可避免,这是博弈均衡的必然结果,文中给出了其证明。通过采取提高罚款数额F(从而提高惩罚系数f)、提高奖励系数λ、降低监控成本C等措施可以将承包商安全不投入,从而将出现安全事故的概率控制在一定范围内。 |
| 关 键 词： | 博弈分析 均衡战略 安全监理 阶段博弈 无限次重复博弈 纳什均衡 |
The Game Analysis on the Engineering Safety Supervision |
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| LU Zhong-shan , YANG Shu-ping , YANG Shan-lin.The Game Analysis on the Engineering Safety Supervision[J].Building Science,2012(1):100-103. | |
| Authors: | LU Zhong-shan YANG Shu-ping YANG Shan-lin |
| Affiliation: | 1.Construction Supervision Co.Ltd,Hefei University of Technology,Hefei 230009,China;2.School of civil engineering,Hefei University of Technology,Hefei 230009,China;3.School of management,Hefei University of Technology,Hefei 230009,China) |
| Abstract: | The engineering safety supervision is analyzed under the framework of game theory.First,the basic hypothesis of game analysis is given,then the stage game and repeated game are analyzed,the equilibrium strategy of the game analysis is produced.It’s the certain result that the contractor will not invest enough to the engineering safety for its benefit and the safety accident will not happen by luck.This paper gives the proof.Through the measures of improving the fine amount F,the fine coefficient f,the reward coefficient λ and reducing the control cost C,we can control the contractor’s no pay for safety and the probability of the safety accident to a certain scope. |
| Keywords: | game analysis equilibrium strategy safety supervision stage game infinitely repeated game Nash equilibrium |
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