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装备采购混合激励问题模型及效率分析
引用本文:杜人淮,赵军杰.装备采购混合激励问题模型及效率分析[J].装备指挥技术学院学报,2008,19(3):6-12.
作者姓名:杜人淮  赵军杰
作者单位:1. 南京政治学院理论二系,江苏南京,210003
2. 94669部队
摘    要:信息不对称以及军方和厂商目标的不相容性,导致了装备采购过程的逆向选择、道德风险和不可验证性等问题。目前,有关装备采购激励问题的研究,多采用经典模型的分析框架。但一般而言,经典模型只能揭示装备采购单个阶段存在的问题,而不能反映装备采购最重要的“多阶段性质特征”。对装备采购混合激励问题的分析——混合模型恰好可弥补经典模型的这一重大缺陷。

关 键 词:装备采购  一般激励问题  混合激励问题

Model and Efficiency Analysis on Mixed Incentive Problems of Equipment Procurement
DU Renhuai,ZHAO Junjie.Model and Efficiency Analysis on Mixed Incentive Problems of Equipment Procurement[J].Journal of the Academy of Equipment Command & Technology,2008,19(3):6-12.
Authors:DU Renhuai  ZHAO Junjie
Affiliation:DU Renhuai , ZHAO Junjie (1. Department of Theory, Nanjing Institute of Politics, Nanjing Jiangsu 210003, China; 2. 94669 Troops, China)
Abstract:Information asymmetry, along with incompatibility between army and manufacturer's goal, induces incentive problems of equipment procurement, which are model hazard, adverse selection and nonverifiability. Presently, in most researches to disclose incentive problems of equipment procurement, classical models are often used. Generally speaking, they only can post the problem in single-stage, but can not reflect multi-stages characteristics of equipment procurement. Mixed model used to analyzes mixed incentive problems can supply the gap nicely.
Keywords:equipment procurement  general incentive problem  mixed incentive problem
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