Cryptanalysis and improvement of a threshold proxy signature scheme

A (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme allows any t or more proxy signers to cooperatively sign messages on behalf of an original signer, but t ? 1 or fewer proxy signers cannot. In a recent work [C.H. Yang, S.F. Tzeng, M.S. Hwang, On the efficiency of nonrepudiable threshold proxy signature scheme with known signers, Systems and Software 73(3) (2004) 507–514], C.H. Yang, S.F. Tzeng and M.S. Hwang proposed a new threshold proxy signature scheme (called as YTH scheme), which is more efficient in algorithm and communication than Hsu et al.'s scheme proposed in 2001. However, YTH scheme still has some security weaknesses. In this paper, we show that YTH scheme cannot resist frame attack and public-key substitute attack. A new improvement with high safety and efficiency is proposed. The new scheme remedies the weaknesses of YTH scheme, especially, it can resist public-key substitute attack successfully by Zero-Knowledge Proof. Furthermore, the system doesn't need a security channel and computational complexity can be lowered.