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UNIFORM—PRICE AUCTION FOR BANDWIDTH ALLOCATION IN THE INTERNET
引用本文:WeiJiaolong ZhangChi. UNIFORM—PRICE AUCTION FOR BANDWIDTH ALLOCATION IN THE INTERNET[J]. 电子科学学刊(英文版), 2002, 19(4): 408-414. DOI: 10.1007/s11767-002-0074-3
作者姓名:WeiJiaolong ZhangChi
作者单位:Dept.ofElectron.andInformation,HuazhongUniv.ofScienceandTechnology,Wuhan430074
基金项目:Supported by Hubei Provincial Foundation for Natural Science under Contract 99J041 and 2001ABB104
摘    要:It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources.Previous works focus on vickrey auction which is incentive compatible in classic auction theory.In the beginning of this letter,the faults of the most representative auction-based mechanisms are discussed.And then a new method called Uniform-Price Auction(UPA),which has the simplest auctiopn rule is proposed and its incentive compatibility in the network environment is also proved.Finally,the basic mode is extended to support applications which require minimum bandwidth guarantees for a given time period by introducing derivative market.and a market mechanism for network resource allocation which is predictable,riskless,and simple for eng-users is completed.

关 键 词:网络资源分配 智能市场模式 统一价格 衍生机械 宽带
收稿时间:2007-02-02

Uniform-price auction for bandwidth allocation in the internet
Jiaolong Wei,Chi Zhang. Uniform-price auction for bandwidth allocation in the internet[J]. Journal of Electronics, 2002, 19(4): 408-414. DOI: 10.1007/s11767-002-0074-3
Authors:Jiaolong Wei  Chi Zhang
Affiliation:Dept. of Electron. and Information, Huazhong Univ. of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074
Abstract:It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incentive compatible in classic auction theory. In the beginning of this letter, the faults of the most representative auction-based mechanisms are discussed. And then a new method called Uniform-Price Auction (UPA), which has the simplest auction rule is proposed and its incentive compatibility in the network environment is also proved. Finally, the basic mode is extended to support applications which require minimum bandwidth guarantees for a given time period by introducing derivative market, and a market mechanism for network resource allocation which is predictable, riskless, and simple for end-users is completed.
Keywords:Network resource allocation  Usage-based pricing  Incentive compatibility  Vick-rey auction  Smart market model  Progressive second price auction  Uniform-price auction  Derivative mechanism
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