| 基于寻租理论的工程安全监理博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 鹿中山,杨善林,杨树萍.基于寻租理论的工程安全监理博弈分析[J].工程管理学报,2010,0(3):281-286. |
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| 作者姓名： | 鹿中山 杨善林 杨树萍 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 合肥工大建设监理有限责任公司 1,2. 合肥工业大学 管理学院 3. 合肥工业大学 土木建筑工程学院 |
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| 摘 要： | 为了深入探讨建筑工程安全监理薄弱的问题，文章运用寻租理论对工程安全监理寻租行为进行成本－收益分析，给出寻租行为产生的条件。运用博弈理论建立了业主与政府建设工程安全监督机构作为一方，监理工程师、承包商作为另外两方的工程安全监理寻租三方博弈模型，并对监理工程师和承包商之间的寻租行为进行博弈分析，提出了治理工程安全监理寻租活动的政策建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 寻租理论 安全监理 成本－收益分析 博弈理论 三方博弈分析 纳什均衡 |
Game Analysis of Engineering Safety Supervision Based on Rent-seeking Theory |
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| LU Zhong-shan,,YANG Shan-lin,YANG Shu-ping.Game Analysis of Engineering Safety Supervision Based on Rent-seeking Theory[J].Journal of Engineering Management,2010,0(3):281-286. |
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| Authors: | LU Zhong-shan YANG Shan-lin YANG Shu-ping |
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| Affiliation: | 1．Construction Supervision Co.，Ltd.，Hefei University of Technology 1,2．School of Management，Hefei University of Technology 3．School of Civil Engineering，Hefei University of Technology |
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| Abstract: | Focusing the problems of poor construction safety supervision，this paper analyzed the cost and benefit on the rent-seeking behavior of engineering safety supervision using rent-seeking theory. The conditions of the rent-seeking behavior were proposed. The third party game model of engineering safety supervision rent-seeking was established according to the game theory in which the owner and the governmental construction safety management agency represent one party，while the supervision engineer and the contractor represent the other two parties. The game analysis of rent-seeking behavior was carried out between the supervision engineer and the contractor. Some suggestions were put forward to control the rent-seeking behavior of engineering safety supervision. |
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| Keywords: | rent-seeking theory safety supervision cost and benefit analysis game theory third party game analysis Nash equilibrium |
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