Pricing and collecting decisions in a closed-loop supply chain with symmetric and asymmetric information |
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| Affiliation: | 1. General Courses Department, Military Transportation University, Tianjin 300161, PR China;2. Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark;3. Business School, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, PR China;4. School of Science, Tianjin Polytechnic University, Tianjin 300160, PR China;1. School of Economics and Management, Hebei University of Technology, Tianjin 300401, PR China;2. School of Science, Tianjin Polytechnic University, Tianjin 300387, PR China;3. Department of Industrial Engineering, University of Talca, Curicó, Chile;1. College of Economics & Management, Huazhong Agriculture University, Wuhan 430070, China;2. School of Management, Wuhan Textile University, Wuhan 430073, China;3. School of Economics and Management, Nanchang University, Nanchang 330031, China;1. School of Science, Tianjin Polytechnic University, Tianjin 300387, PR China;2. General Courses Department, Military Transportation University, Tianjin 300161, PR China;3. Business School, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, PR China;1. China Academy of Corporate Governance, Business School, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, PR China;2. College of Economic and Social Development, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, PR China |
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| Abstract: | The optimal decision problem of a closed-loop supply chain with symmetric and asymmetric information structures is considered using game theory in this paper. The paper aims to explore how the manufacturer and the retailer make their own decisions about wholesale price, retail price, and collection rate under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions. Four game models are established, which allow one to examine the strategies of each firm and explore the role of the manufacturer and the retailer in four different game scenarios under symmetric and asymmetric information structures. The optimal strategies in closed form are given under the decision scenarios with symmetric information; moreover, the first order conditions that the optimal retail price, optimal wholesale price, and optimal collection rate satisfy are given under the decision scenarios with asymmetric information. The results obtained under symmetric and asymmetric information conditions and some key model parameters used in this paper are analyzed using a numerical approach by which some managerial analysis are given. |
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| Keywords: | Closed-loop supply chain Symmetric and asymmetric information Pricing and collecting decisions |
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