| 价格约束机制和违约惩罚约束机制的对比分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 谷文林. 价格约束机制和违约惩罚约束机制的对比分析[J]. 工业工程与管理, 2005, 10(5): 23-26 |
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| 作者姓名： | 谷文林 |
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| 作者单位： | 河海大学,商学院,江苏,南京,210098 |
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| 摘 要： | 通过价格约束机制和违约惩罚约束机制比较分析得出,在销售商的灵活订货的策略下,制造商不能利用价格杠杆来约束销售商的行为.如果在购销合同中引进惩罚条款,制造商则可以利用违约惩罚机制约束销售商的灵活订货的行为,合适的违约罚金使得供销双方形成双赢局面.
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| 关 键 词： | 价格约束 违约 灵活定购 期望值 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-5429(2005)05-0023-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2004-09-25 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-01-25 |
Comparative Analysis between Mechanism of Price-restricted and Default-restricted |
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| GU Wen-lin. Comparative Analysis between Mechanism of Price-restricted and Default-restricted[J]. Industrial Engineering and Management, 2005, 10(5): 23-26 |
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| Authors: | GU Wen-lin |
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| Affiliation: | Business School of He Hai University, Nanjng 210095, China |
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| Abstract: | This paper compares the mechanism of price-restricted with the mechanism of default-restricted and shows that manufacturers restrict retailers' behavior with price leverage under the strategy of flexible order.If punishment item is introduced into the contract of purchase and sale,then the manufacturers will utilize default punishment to restrict flexible orders from retailers.And suitable default fine makes both the producers and retailers fully satisfied. |
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| Keywords: | price - restricted default flexible order expected value |
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