| 流域水污染治理模式的进化博弈模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘起方,马光文,刘群英.流域水污染治理模式的进化博弈模型[J].水资源保护,2008,24(3):69-72. |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘起方 马光文 刘群英 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 四川大学水利水电学院,四川,成都,610065
2. 四川大学电气信息学院,四川,成都,610065 |
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| 摘 要： | 运用进化博弈理论,分析了流域治理中管理者和排污企业基于利益因素的动态博弈特征,并以淮河流域的治理情况进行了实际论证分析。结果表明,只有考虑基层政府的利益机制、适当的配套投入以及纳入政绩考核体系才能有效推动流域水污染治理。
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| 关 键 词： | 流域 污染治理 进化博弈 稳定策略 |
| 文章编号： | 1004-6933(2008)03-0069-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007年7月23日 |
Evolutionary game theory for water pollution control in river basins |
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| LIU Qi-fang,MA Guang-wen,LIU Qun-ying.Evolutionary game theory for water pollution control in river basins[J].Water Resources Protection,2008,24(3):69-72. |
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| Authors: | LIU Qi-fang MA Guang-wen LIU Qun-ying |
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| Affiliation: | LIU Qi-fang, MA Guang-wen, LIU Qun-ying (1. College of Water Resource and Hydropower, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China; 2. College of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610065, China) |
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| Abstract: | The characteristics of the dynamic game between administrators and pollution discharge companies, each side acting in its self-interest in watershed management, are analyzed using the evolutionary game theory. A case study on the Huaihe River Basin shows that a mechanism taking the benefits of the local governments into consideration, an appropriate public subsidy system for the treatment of wastewater and a policy using the ecologieal loss as an index of government＇ s achievement would help to improve water pollution control in river basins. |
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| Keywords: | river basin pollution control evolutionary game stability strategy |
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