| EPR实施中政府与汽车生产企业间的博弈分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 田肇云. EPR实施中政府与汽车生产企业间的博弈分析[J]. 北京机械工业学院学报, 2010, 0(4): 21-23 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 田肇云 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 北京信息科技大学经济管理学院,北京100192 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 北京市教委科技项目（SM201010772001）;国家自然科学基金项目（70873005） |
| |
| 摘 要： | 政府主管部门与汽车生产企业之间在面对报废汽车回收的实施与监督方面存在博弈关系，市场均衡的形成取决于二者的策略选择。通过对其静态博弈和重复博弈的分析显示：为了获得长远的利益，政府必须加大奖惩和监管力度，而汽车生产企业应积极实施EPR，只有双方各自履行相应的责任，才能实现共赢。
|
| 关 键 词： | 生产者延伸责任 报废汽车 静态博弈 重复博弈 |
A game analysis between government and automobile manufacturers on implementing EPR |
| |
| Affiliation: | TIAN Zhzo-yun (School of Economics ＆ Management, Beijing Information Science and Technology University,Beijing 100192, China) |
| |
| Abstract: | There is a game relationship between government departments and automobile manufacturers on implementing EPR and supervising for recycling scrap vehicles. Thus the market equilibrium will depend on their strategies. Through the study of static and repeated game models, this paper concludes that government departments should strengthen rewards and punishments and automobile manufacturers should implement EPR positively. It is the only way to realize win-win strategy between them in the long run. |
| |
| Keywords: | extended producer responsibility scrap vehicles static game repeated game |
| 本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
