Energy caps: Alternative climate policy instruments for China? |
| |
| Affiliation: | 1. MIT-Tsinghua China Energy and Climate Project, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China;2. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, USA;3. Department of Management, Technology and Economics, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland;4. MIT-Tsinghua China Energy and Climate Project, Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA;1. University of Münster, Germany;2. Leibniz University of Hanover, Institute for Environmental Economics and World Trade (IUW), Germany;3. Bihl+Wiedemann GmbH, Germany;1. MIT Energy Initiative, MA Institute of Technology, USA;2. Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, MA Institute of Technology, USA;3. Department of Management, Technology, and Economics, ETH Zurich, Center for Economic Research at ETH (CER-ETH), Switzerland;4. Institute for Research in Technology, Comillas Pontifical University, Spain;1. Research Center for Contemporary Management, Institute of Energy, Environment and Economy, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;2. Department of Urban Planning and Design, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Pokfulam, Hong Kong, SAR, China;3. Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA;1. Department of Management, Technology and Economics, Center for Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Switzerland;2. Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, USA |
| |
| Abstract: | Decoupling fossil energy demand from economic growth is crucial for China's sustainable development, especially for addressing severe local air pollution and global climate change. An absolute cap on coal or fossil fuel consumption has been proposed as a means to support the country's energy and climate policy objectives. We evaluate potential energy cap designs that differ in terms of target fuel, point of control, and national versus regional allowance trading using a global numerical general equilibrium model that separately represents 30 provinces in China. First, we simulate a coal cap and find that relative to a cap on all fossil fuels, it is significantly more costly and results in high localized welfare losses. Second, we compare fossil energy cap designs and find that a national cap on downstream fossil energy use with allowance trading across provinces is the most cost effective. Third, we find that a national fossil energy cap with trading is nearly as cost effective as a national CO2 emissions trading system that penalizes energy use based on carbon content. As a fossil energy cap builds on existing institutions in China, it offers a viable intermediate step toward a full-fledged CO2 emissions trading system. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
