| 不对称信息下的协商机制设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 郭文革 金武. 不对称信息下的协商机制设计[J]. 控制与决策, 1995, 10(4): 304-310 |
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| 作者姓名： | 郭文革 金武 |
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| 作者单位： | 华中理工大学系统工程研究所 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学青年基金,博士点基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 探讨交易双方存在不对称信息结构下协商机制的设计问题，给出了具有激励相容性，事后理性协商机制的完全刻画，在此基础上探讨了其效率问题，分别给出了上述机制的具有事前有效性和事后有效性的完全刻画，最后应用协商双方价值具有线性相关性的实例予以说明。
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| 关 键 词： | 协商机制 不对称信息 商品交易 商业经济学 |
Bargaining Mechanism Design under Asymmetric Information |
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| Guo Wenge, Jin Wu, Chen Ting. Bargaining Mechanism Design under Asymmetric Information[J]. Control and Decision, 1995, 10(4): 304-310 |
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| Authors: | Guo Wenge Jin Wu Chen Ting |
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| Affiliation: | Huazhong University of Science and Technology |
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| Abstract: | his paper investigates two- person bargaining under incomplete information where one player has more information concerning the potential value of the transaction than the other. Bargaining mechanism with Bayesian incentive compatibility and ex post individual rationality are characterized. Based on the result,ex ante efficient mechanisms and ex post efficient mechanisms are examed. Finally, a numerial example is given. |
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| Keywords: | bargaining mechanism asymmetric information incentive compatibility ex post individual rationality efficiency |
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