| 上市公司虚假信息披露的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 吴振信,张雪峰.上市公司虚假信息披露的博弈分析[J].北方工业大学学报,2010,22(4):7-11,37. |
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| 作者姓名： | 吴振信 张雪峰 |
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| 作者单位： | 北方工业大学经济管理学院,100144,北京;北方工业大学经济管理学院,100144,北京 |
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| 基金项目： | 北京市学科与研究生教育基金项目(PXM-2009-014212-077689) |
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| 摘 要： | 本文构建了动态博弈模型以分析上市公司虚假信息披露问题。研究发现:虚假信息披露程度与监管者稽查概率、惩罚力度和贴现因子呈反向变动关系;对管理者实行的股权激励计划应该控制在一定范围内,否则将会加大虚假信息披露程度;随着股权激励的加强,应该加大对管理者的惩罚力度;对于公司治理结构和资本结构越完善的上市公司查处虚假信息披露后,越应该加大对大股东的惩罚力度。
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| 关 键 词： | 信息披露 博弈 监管 |
Game Analysis of False Information Disclosure of Listed Companies |
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| Wu Zhenxin,Zhang Xuefeng.Game Analysis of False Information Disclosure of Listed Companies[J].Journal of North China University of Technology,2010,22(4):7-11,37. |
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| Authors: | Wu Zhenxin Zhang Xuefeng |
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| Affiliation: | Wu Zhenxin Zhang Xuefeng(Col.of Economics & Business Administration,North China Univ.of Tech.,100144,Beijing,China) |
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| Abstract: | This paper establishes a dynamic game model to analyze the issues of the disclosure of false information of listed companies.The study shows that the extent of false information disclosure is inversely related to monitor probability,intensity of penalty,and discount factor.The executive stock option incentive should be limited to a certain level,beyond which the extent of false information disclosure will be magnified.The more the option incentive,the greater the intensity of penalty should be on managers.F... |
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| Keywords: | information disclosure game supervision |
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