| Abstract: | Traces the conceptual impasse that opposes free will and determinism to the dichotomy between subject and object, and to the limitations imposed by the thinking that underlies this division. Thinking rooted in the dialectics of subject and object transcends the impasse of the traditional debate and provides a more complete account of the experiential given of self and of free will. H. Bergson (1959) and M. Merleau-Ponty (1966) are used as examples of applying this dialectical thinking to the problem of freedom and determinism. This approach is then applied to the common analysis of the act of will (which divides will into motive, deliberation, choice, and action), and with the help of a clinical vignette, the self and free agency emerge naturally from the dialectical nature of the data. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved) |
