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Weakly strict equilibria in finite normal form games |
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| Authors: | P. E. M. Borm R. Cao I. García-Jurado L. Méndez-Naya |
| Affiliation: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Tilburg, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands;(2) Department of Computer Science, University of La Coruña, E-15071 La Coruña, Spain;(3) Department of Statistics and Operations Research, University of Santiago de Compostela, E-15771 Santiago de Compostela, Spain;(4) Department of Economics, University of Santiago de Compostela, E-15771 Santiago de Compostela, Spain |
| Abstract: | In this paper we introduce the weakly strict equilibrium for (mixed extensions of) finiten-person games. For those games we prove that our new concept is a strict refinement of the undominated Nash equilibrium concept. We show that their set of weakly strict equilibria is nonempty and coincides with their set of strict equilibria (when the latter is also non-empty) and we study the relation between our refinement and other noncooperative concepts.We thank Xunta de Galicia for financial support through project XUGA20702B93 |
| Keywords: | Nash equilibrium strict equilibrium weakly strict equilibrium normal form games random games |
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