基于序贯博弈的装备制造业复杂产品研发补贴和关税决策

增大国内装备制造业的研发投入和引入国外产品带来的研发溢出可提升国内装备制造业科技水平,但同时带来了企业的研发成本负担和国外产品抢占国内市场的问题,因此政府在其中的研发补贴和关税政策调控显得尤为迫切.探究政府研发补贴和关税政策对存在研发溢出的国外装备制造商和国内装备制造商进行序贯博弈时的市场份额、利润和研发水平的影响问题.进一步分析政府以社会福利最大为目标时,政府的最优决策并对关键因素进行敏感性分析.最后通过数值扩展验证结论的稳健性.研究发现:研发补贴系数或关税增大都会提高(降低)国内制造商(国外制造商)的产量、利润和研发水平;政府以社会福利最大进行决策时,随着两种产品竞争强度的增大,总的研发补贴会减小,而单位研发补贴先减后增,关税先增后减.研发成本系数越高,关税和单位研发补贴会越高,但总的研发补贴会减少.

R&D subsidies and tariff decisions of CoPS in equipment manufacture industry based on sequential games

Increasing R&D investment in domestic equipment manufacturing industry and introducing foreign products brings R&D spillover, which can improve the technology level of domestic equipment manufacturing industry, but at the same time brings the burden of R&D cost of enterprises and foreign products to seize the domestic market, so the government''s R&D subsidies and tariff policy regulation is particularly urgent therein. This paper explores the impact of government R&D subsidies and tariff policies on the market share, profit and R&D level of foreign equipment manufacturers with R&D spillover and sequential game with domestic equipment manufacturers. It further analyzes the optimal decision of the government when the government aims at maximizing social welfare and conducts sensitivity analysis on the key factors. Finally, the robustness of the findings is verified by numerical extensions. It is found that: an increase in either the R&D subsidy coefficient or tariff increases (decreases) the output, profit and R&D level of domestic manufacturers (foreign manufacturers); the total R&D subsidy decreases as the intensity of competition between the two products increases, while the unit R&D subsidy decreases and then increases, and the tariff increases and then decreases, when the government makes the decision with social welfare maximization. The higher the R&D cost factor is, the higher the tariff and unit R&D subsidy will be, but the total R&D subsidy will decrease.