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基于消费者异质性需求的闭环供应链再制造授权模式研究
引用本文:程红亚,孟丽君,扈裕晴,黄祖庆.基于消费者异质性需求的闭环供应链再制造授权模式研究[J].工业工程,2021,24(6):140-149.
作者姓名:程红亚  孟丽君  扈裕晴  黄祖庆
作者单位:中国计量大学 经济与管理学院,浙江 杭州 310018;广州大学 管理学院,广东 广州 510006
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71801199);教育部人文社会科学研究基金资助项目(18YJC630123)
摘    要:在消费者异质性需求的市场中,为了探讨最佳的再制造授权模式,基于原始设备制造商(original equipment manufacturer, OEM)与第三方再制造商((third party remanufacturer, TPR)同时进行再制造的闭环供应链(closed loop supply chain, CLSC),采用博弈论分别讨论TPR独立再制造和OEM专利授权再制造(包括单位费用授权和固定费用授权)的CLSC决策模型,对比3种模型的均衡解及最优利润,并分析TPR再制品市场接受度、再制造成本节约对均衡解及企业利润的影响。研究表明,授权增加了OEM利润,故OEM更倾向于对TPR进行授权,并根据固定授权费的大小来决定授权模式;CLSC总利润在固定费用授权模式下最大,且该模式下消费者的购买成本最低;TPR再制品市场接受度及再制造成本节约的增加可提高TPR利润,但会加大对OEM再制品的挤兑程度,最终导致OEM提高授权费来弥补利润损失。

关 键 词:专利授权  异质需求  再制造  博弈论
收稿时间:2020-11-10

A Research on Remanufacturing Authorization Model of Closed Loop Supply Chain Based on Consumer Heterogeneous Demand
CHENG Hongya,MENG Lijun,HU Yuqing,HUANG Zuqing.A Research on Remanufacturing Authorization Model of Closed Loop Supply Chain Based on Consumer Heterogeneous Demand[J].Industrial Engineering Journal,2021,24(6):140-149.
Authors:CHENG Hongya  MENG Lijun  HU Yuqing  HUANG Zuqing
Affiliation:1. College of Economics & Management, China Jiliang University, Hangzhou 310018, China;2. School of Management, Guangzhou University, Guangzhou 510006, China
Abstract:In order to explore the best remanufacturing authorization model in the market with heterogeneous consumer demand, based on the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) in which the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and the third party remanufacturer (TPR) remanufacture simultaneously, the CLSC decision-making model of TPR independent remanufacturing and OEM patent authorization remanufacturing (including unit fee authorization and fixed fee authorization) are separately discussed using game theory, the equilibrium solution and optimal profit of the three models compared, and the effects of market acceptance of TPR remanufacturing and remanufacturing cost saving on equilibrium solution and enterprise profit analyzed. The results show that: authorization increases OEM profits, so OEM prefers to authorize TPR and decide the authorization mode according to the size of fixed license fee; the total profit of CLSC is the largest under the fixed fee authorization mode, and the purchase cost of consumers is the lowest under this mode; the increase of TPR remanufacturing market acceptance and remanufacturing cost saving can improve TPR profit, but it will increase the run on OEM remanufactures, and eventually lead to the increase of OEM licensing fee to make up for the loss of profits.
Keywords:patent authorization  heterogeneous demand  remanufacturing  game theory  
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