考虑制造商设备维修的制造—零售供应链决策与协调

设备可靠性是影响供应不确定的重要因素。为了研究企业内部的维修策略对整条供应链的运营策略产生的具体影响，在考虑设备维修的情况下，针对单个制造商和单个零售商构成的二级供应链，运用Stackelberg博弈的方法研究制造商的最优维修策略和定价策略以及零售商的最优订货量。研究结果表明，制造商的预防性维修次数存在上限且最大维修次数与设备可靠性无关；预防性维修策略有助于提高制造商的产量，降低产品的批发价格，但制造商的最优产出量不会达到企业的最大产能；收益共享契约能够实现供应链的协调；制造商在任何情形下都具有提高设备可靠性的动机，但零售商只会在市场规模较大时才存在为制造商提供设备改造资金的动机。

The Decision and Coordination of Manufacturing-Retail Supply Chain with Manufacturer Equipment Maintenance

Equipment reliability is an significant factor affecting supply uncertainty. In order to study the influence of the maintenance strategy within the enterprise on the operation strategy of the entire supply chain, considering the equipment maintenance, the manufacturer's optimal maintenance strategy and production strategy and the retailer's optimal order quantity are studied for the supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer by Stackelberg game. The results show that the manufacturer's maximum number of preventive maintenance has no relevance to the reliability of the equipment; preventive maintenance can increase the manufacturer's output and reduce the wholesale price of the product, but the optimal output of the manufacturer will not reach the enterprise maximum production capacity; revenue-sharing contract can realize the coordination of supply chain; the manufacturer always has incentive to improve the equipment reliability while the retailer has incentive to fund the equipment improvements only when the market base is large enough.