基于互补产品的双渠道供应链合作广告博弈分析

针对互补产品的双渠道供应链合作广告问题，在考虑互补产品溢出效应的基础上，构建以制造商为领导者的Stackelberg主从博弈分散决策模型和集中决策模型，通过求解模型给出不同决策模式下制造商最优广告策略、零售商最优广告策略及最优合作广告分担率，最后以数值算例验证相关结论。研究结果表明：制造商关于某产品的广告投入水平与制造商关于该产品及其互补产品在网络渠道、零售渠道的边际利润正相关，且制造商关于其互补产品在网络渠道、零售渠道的边际利润对制造商关于该产品的广告投入的影响水平取决于产品的溢出效应系数；制造商对某产品的合作广告分担率除了与该产品及其互补产品在各渠道的边际利润有关外，还与零售商广告对网络渠道的影响性质有关。

A Game Analysis of Cooperative Advertising in Dual-channel Supply Chain Based on Complementary Products

To solve the problem of cooperative advertising in dual-channel supply chain of complementary products, a Stackelberg master decentralized decision model and a centralized decision model with the manufacturer as the leader considering the spillover effect of complementary products are established. By solving the models, the optimal advertising strategy of the manufacturer, the optimal advertising strategy of the retailer and the optimal sharing rate of cooperative advertising under different decision-making modes are given. Finally, a numerical example is given to verify the relevant conclusions. The results show that the manufacturer's advertisement expenditure on a product is positively correlated with the manufacturer's marginal profits in two channels about the product and its complementary product; the marginal profits of the manufacturer's complementary products in the network channel and retail channel have an impact on the manufacturer's advertisement expenditure on the product, and the incidence depends on the spillover effect coefficient of the product; in addition to the marginal profits of the product and its complementary product in each channel, the manufacturer's cooperative advertising share rate for a product is also related to the nature of the impact of retailer's advertising on the network channel; and the manufacturer's advertisement expenditure, retailer's advertisement expenditure and total profits of the supply chain under centralized decision-making mode are better than decentralized decision-making.