建设工程项目激励模型中的激励失效问题优化研究

分析表明，以往有关声誉协同激励的探讨常常会引发激励失效的问题，有以下表现：仅仅分析声誉一个因素的模型，容易产生激励失衡；但忽视声誉，只对各要素的协同性进行探讨的激励模型，则会发生激励过剩的情况。基于此，本文综合工期、质量之间的替代性特点，站在业主角度建立结合显性、隐性声誉的两阶段动态激励模型，有效防止激励失效问题的发生，进而提出使模型发挥作用的有效区间的判断方法。最后，文章采用算例及数据模拟的方式，对以上结论作出了证明。

An Optimization Research on Invalid Incentive Problem in Construction Project Incentive Model

The analysis shows that previous discussions on reputation collaborative incentives often lead to the failure of incentives, with the following manifestations: A reputation incentive model that only considers one factor will lead to incentive imbalance, The cooperative incentive model without reputation is easy to make the incentive surplus. Therefore, the substitutability between construction period and quality factors are fully considered. From the perspective of the owner, a two-stage dynamic incentive model considering both explicit reputation and implicit reputation is constructed to solve the above problems. Furthermore, the method to determine the effective interval of the multi-factor collaborative incentive model with dual reputation is studied. Finally, the rationality of the model is verified by an example and data simulation.