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基于制造商生产成本扰动的不同主导权下供应链脆弱性研究
引用本文:张萌萌,闫秀霞,董友衡. 基于制造商生产成本扰动的不同主导权下供应链脆弱性研究[J]. 工业工程, 2021, 24(6): 123. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2021.06.016
作者姓名:张萌萌  闫秀霞  董友衡
作者单位:山东理工大学 管理学院,山东 淄博 255000
基金项目:教育部人文社科规划课题资助项目(18YJA630125);山东省社科规划课题资助项目(18CJJJ17)
摘    要:为了定量研究生产成本扰动和不同权利结构下的供应链脆弱性,分别构建集中决策、制造商主导和零售商主导的线上线下双渠道供应链和直销供应链两种供应链博弈模型。采用使供应链最优决策保持不变的制造商生产成本扰动区间长度来衡量供应链脆弱性的大小,区间长度越大,供应链脆弱性越小。结果表明:1)对线上线下双渠道供应链而言,集中决策和制造商主导时的成本扰动区间长度相等,即脆弱性相同,且大于零售商主导时的脆弱性;2)对直销供应链而言,制造商主导时的成本扰动区间长度大于集中决策时的区间长度,即制造商主导时的供应链脆弱性小于集中决策时的脆弱性,而零售商主导时脆弱性的大小与参数βk有关。最后通过数值仿真验证了该方法的可行性。

关 键 词:供应链  脆弱性  博弈论  权力结构  成本扰动
收稿时间:2020-09-30

A Research on Supply Chain Vulnerability under Different Dominance Based on the Manufacturer's Production Cost Disturbance
ZHANG Mengmeng,YAN Xiuxia,DONG Youheng. A Research on Supply Chain Vulnerability under Different Dominance Based on the Manufacturer's Production Cost Disturbance[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2021, 24(6): 123. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-7375.2021.06.016
Authors:ZHANG Mengmeng  YAN Xiuxia  DONG Youheng
Affiliation:School of Management, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo 255000,China
Abstract:For a quantitative research on the vulnerability of supply chain under the disturbance of production cost and different power structures, two supply chain game models of centralized decision-making, manufacturer-led and retailer-led online and offline dual-channel supply chain and direct channel supply chain were constructed. The length of the manufacturer’s production cost disturbance interval which keeps the optimal decision of supply chain unchanged was used to measure the vulnerability of supply chain and the larger the interval length was, the smaller the vulnerability of supply chain was. The results show that: 1) for online and offline dual-channel supply chain, the length of the cost disturbance interval is equal to that of the centralized decision-making and is manufacturer-dominated, that is, they have the same vulnerability but it is greater than the retailer-dominated vulnerability; 2) for the direct supply chain, the length of the manufacturer-dominated cost disturbance interval is greater than the centralized decision, that is, the manufacturer-dominated supply chain vulnerability is less than in the centralized decision, while the size of retailer-dominated supply chain vulnerability is related to the parameters β and k. Finally, the feasibility of the proposed method is verified by numerical simulations.
Keywords:supply chain  vulnerability  game theory  power structure  cost disturbance  
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