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基于众筹预售和众包生产的两阶段最优定价机制
引用本文:吴小红. 基于众筹预售和众包生产的两阶段最优定价机制[J]. 计算机应用研究, 2023, 40(8)
作者姓名:吴小红
作者单位:湖州师范学院信息工程学院,浙江湖州313000;浙江省现代农业资源智慧管理与应用研究重点实验室,浙江湖州313000;湖州师范学院信息工程学院,浙江湖州313000;湖州学院,浙江湖州313000
摘    要:为实现农产品产销供应链中按需生产,供需平衡的同时,提高电商平台的期望收益。分析了电商平台整个产销供应链的问题模型,提出一种基于电子商务平台众筹预售和众包生产的产销模式。基于迈尔森最优拍卖理论设计了众筹预售和众包分配的两阶段最优拍卖定价机制,能够在保证参与用户诚实报价的基础上,同时最大化电商平台的期望收益。实验结果表明,对比传统的先到先服务算法(FCFS),平均收益在需求数量区间为均匀分布时至少增加了5%,为指数分布时至少增加了18%,且至少能达到假设用户诚实报价下的最优利润(OP)收益的50%。

关 键 词:拍卖  迈尔森理论  诚实性  众筹预售  众包分配
收稿时间:2022-12-23
修稿时间:2023-07-09

Two-stage optimal pricing mechanism based on crowdfunding pre-sales and crowdsourcing production
Wu Xiaohong. Two-stage optimal pricing mechanism based on crowdfunding pre-sales and crowdsourcing production[J]. Application Research of Computers, 2023, 40(8)
Authors:Wu Xiaohong
Affiliation:Huzhou University
Abstract:In order to achieve on-demand production and supply-demand balance in the supply chain of agricultural products, and at the same time to improve the expected benefits of e-commerce platform, this paper analyzed the problem model of the whole supply chain of e-commerce platform, and proposed a production and marketing mode based on crowdfunding pre-sale and crowdsourcing allocation of e-commerce platform. Based on Myerson''s optimal auction theory, this paper designed a two-stage pricing mechanism for crowdfunding pre-sale and crowdsourcing allocation, which could maximize the expected revenue of e-commerce platforms while guaranteeing the honest quotation of users. The results show that, compared with the traditional first-come-first-service algorithm(FCFS), the average revenue increases by at least 5% when the demand quantity is evenly distributed, by at least 18% when the demand quantity is exponentially distributed, and reaches at least 50% of the optimal profit(OP) profit under the assumption that users are quoting honestly.
Keywords:auction   Myerson''s theory   truthfulness   crowdfunding pre-sale   crowdsourcing allocation
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