电力需求侧管理政策激励过程的动态演化博弈分析

电力需求侧管理(power demand-side management, DSM)具有优化电力资源配置、促进节能减排、移峰填谷、促进可再生能源发展等优点。但在当前电力市场环境下,DSM项目实施过程中项目成本与项目收益具有严重的“不同一性”,对电网企业和电力用户实施DSM项目和接受DSM服务存在一定的抑制作用。同时,电力需求侧管理体系中的政府、电网企业、电力用户三方主体利益出发点不同,必然会存在激烈的博弈。为了确切地分析电力需求侧管理体系各主体之间博弈行为,着眼于电力需求侧管理政策运行环境,采用动态演化博弈模型分析电力需求侧管理过程中政府电网企业、政府电力用户之间的博弈行为,优化设计电力需求侧管理政策激励措施,消除DSM对电网企业和电力用户投资的抑制作用,促进电力需求侧管理的深化发展。

Power Demand Side Management Policy Incentive Process Dynamic Evolutionary Game Analysis

Power demand side management(DSM) has many advantages, including the optimization of power resource allocation, promoting energy conservation and emission reduction, realizing peak load shifting and renewable energy development, etc. However, under the current electricity market environment, there exists sever nonidentity between the cost of DSM and its expected profit, which may weaken the enthusiasm of power grid companies and terminal users. At the same time, the foremost motivation among governments, power grid companies and power users are different, which will lead to intense game. In order to better analyze the game behavior of the main participants, this paper focus on the politic environment of power demand side, and applies an dynamic evolutionary game model to analyze the game between the government and power companies, as well as the government and users. In addition, some measures of power demand side management are proposed to eliminate the restraint among power grid company and power users that caused by DSM, which is the future direction of this field.