| 交通诱导-出行信号博弈分析及其虚拟行动学习模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘建美,马寿峰. 交通诱导-出行信号博弈分析及其虚拟行动学习模型[J]. 武汉大学学报(工学版), 2010, 43(1) |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘建美 马寿峰 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津大学系统工程研究所,天津,300072 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目(编号:70671073); 国家高技术研究发展计划(863)项目(编号:2006AA11Z210) |
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| 摘 要： | 交通出行过程中,诱导信息的发布与出行路径的选择是两个相互联系相互影响的决策过程,基于此建立了诱导-出行信号博弈模型,并依据其信号均衡将路网分成了不同的等级.为验证均衡解的合理性,提出了一种基于完全但不完美信息动态博弈的虚拟行动学习模型并应用于此问题,收到了很好的学习仿真效果,最后给出了相应的收敛性定理及其证明.
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| 关 键 词： | 诱导 出行路径 信号博弈 虚拟行动 完美贝叶斯均衡 |
Analysis of guidance-travel signaling game and fictitious play model |
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| LIU Jianmei,MA Shoufeng. Analysis of guidance-travel signaling game and fictitious play model[J]. Engineering Journal of Wuhan University, 2010, 43(1) |
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| Authors: | LIU Jianmei MA Shoufeng |
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| Affiliation: | LIU Jianmei,MA Shoufeng(Institute of Systems Engineering,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China) |
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| Abstract: | The issuance of traffic guidance information and route choice are two interactional processes.First,a guidance-travel signaling game model is given based on the relationship and dividing road network into different running grades according to its signaling equilibriums(SE).Then,in order to validate the feasibility of SE,a fictitious play model is constructed based on the complete but imperfect information dynamic game with effective emulation results.Finally,the convergence theorem and its strict proof are ... |
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| Keywords: | guidance route choice signaling game fictitious play perfect Bayes Nash equilibrium |
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