基于讨价还价博弈的 PPP 项目运营商的激励契约设计

在现实代理人市场不完全竞争条件下，假设 PPP 项目公司（由项目投资者为主体组建）和 PPP 运营公司双方均重视依靠讨价还价来进行激励契约的谈判，根据 PPP 项目公司先出价建立无限期讨价还价模型，并求解出唯一子博弈精练纳什均衡，在均衡契约中，PPP 项目公司获得固定的项目净利润，而具体运营 PPP 项目的运营公司则获得剩余部分的利润，利用破裂点（谈判破裂谈判双方依旧可以得到的最低收益）和子博弈纳什均衡给委托代理双方提供一份非线性激励契约。通过实证分析该激励契约是有效的，并且更加符合实际情况。

Incentive Contract of PPP Project Operation Company Based onBargaining Game

Differing from the ultimate Principal-agent contract and the linear contract of fixed salary plus performance in HMagent contract, considering that the real agent market is not fully competitive，it is assumed that both the PPP project company（mainly consists of project investors）and the PPP operating company pay attention to negotiation of incentive contract bybargaining. Based on PPP project company first bid, we establish indefinite bargaining model and solve the singular subgameconcise Nash equilibrium. The PPP project company obtains the fixed project net profit，and the operating company obtains thesurplus part the profit. Finally, the rupture point （negotiates （the negotiating point） and the sub-game Nash equilibrium areused to provide a non-linear incentive contract to both the principal and agent. It is proved that the incentive contract is valid andmore in line with the actual situation.