基于寻租理论的工程项目主体三方演化博弈分析

借鉴西方寻租理论与委托代理理论，揭示了监理与承包商之间的寻租动机。运用演化博弈理论，基于行为人有限理性建立业主、监理和承包商三方演化博弈模型。分 4 种情况求解演化稳定策略 ESS，发现情况 1 和情况 2 相对于情况 3 是一种帕累托改进，但却导致了业主的损失，而情况 3 则加大了社会福利的损耗。因此，需采取提高稽查能力系数、减少稽查成本、加大惩罚力度、增大寻租成本、适当增加监理工资等措施。而这些措施将最终导致情况 4 的发生，从而解释了为何寻租问题许久未能解决的原因。进一步，研究发现寻租双方的共同寻租率在其寻租成本与潜在租金相等时具有突变性的规律，该规律揭示了消除寻租现象而引致帕累托最优的根本方法

Tripartite Evolution Game Analysis of Project ParticipantsBased on Rent - Seeking Theory

Based on the theory of rent-seeking and principal-agent theory，this paper reveals the motive of rent-seeking between thesupervisor and the contractor. Based on evolutionary game theory，the game model of owner，supervisor and contractor is establishedbased on the bounded rationality of actors. In the four situations，ESS was found to be a Pareto improvement compared with situation3，but the loss was caused by situation 1 and situation 2，and situation 3 increased the loss of social welfare. Therefore，measuresshould be taken to improve the inspection ability，reduce the cost of inspection，increase the penalty，increase the rent-seeking cost，and increase the supervision salary. These measures will eventually lead to the occurrence of situation 4，which explains why therent-seeking problem for a long time failed to solve the reason. Furthermore，it is found that the common rent seeking rate ofrent-seeking parties has the law of mutability when the rent-seeking cost is equal to the potential rent，which reveals the basic methodof eliminating Pareto-optimal.