| 基于非对称信息的工程监理激励机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 曹玉贵,杨忠直. 基于非对称信息的工程监理激励机制研究[J]. 中国工程科学, 2005, 7(10): 69-72 |
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| 作者姓名： | 曹玉贵 杨忠直 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 天津大学管理学院,天津,300072
2. 上海交通大学管理学院,上海,200052 |
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| 基金项目： | 河南省教育厅自然科学基金资助项目(2004110002) |
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| 摘 要： | 通过建立考虑业主投资规模、工程监理特质和外生随机变量及其影响程度等因素的业主与工程监理之间的委托-代理模型，分析了非对称信息下工程投资规模、工程监理特质和外生随机变量等因素对激励报酬系数的影响。同时，基于分析和研究结果，提出了设计工程监理激励机制必须考虑的影响因素。
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| 关 键 词： | 项目业主；工程监理；委托代理；激励机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1009-1742（2005）10-0069-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-01-24 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-04-21 |
The Study on Supervision Institution Incentive System Based on Asymmetric Information |
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| caoyugui and yangzhongzhi. The Study on Supervision Institution Incentive System Based on Asymmetric Information[J]. Engineering Science, 2005, 7(10): 69-72 |
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| Authors: | caoyugui and yangzhongzhi |
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| Abstract: | The principal-agent model between employers and engineering supervisors is established, considering such factors as the scale of employers' investment, special character of engineering supervision and exogenous random variable and its influence. And the influence of these factors on the sensitiveness of compensation performance under asymmetric information is analyzed. Based on the result, factors to be considered while establishing the incentive system of engineering supervision are put forward. |
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| Keywords: | employer engineering supervision principal-agent incentive system |
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