Strategic behavior in electric generation markets via dynamic governor control design |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Laboratory of Production Management Information Systems, Department of Industrial Management & Technology, University of Piraeus, Karaoli and Dimitriou 80, 18534, Piraeus, Greece;2. Management Science Laboratory, Department of Management Science & Technology, Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens, Greece;3. ELTRUN Research Center, Department of Management Science & Technology, Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens, Greece;4. Department of Marketing & Communication, Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens, Greece;1. Mohammed Bin Rashid University of Medicine and Health Sciences, Design Lab, Dubai, United Arab Emirates;2. Department of Pediatric Emergency Medicine, Geneva University Hospitals, Geneva, Switzerland;3. Department of Emergency Medicine, Dar Al Shifa Hospital, Hawally, Kuwait;4. Geneva University Hospitals, Geneva, Switzerland;1. College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, PR China;2. Labovitz School of Business and Economics, University of Minnesota Duluth, Duluth, MN 55812-2496, United States;1. NHL University of Applied Sciences, Leeuwarden, The Netherlands;2. MCL Academy of Leeuwarden, The Netherlands;3. Medical Center Leeuwarden, Surgery Department, Leeuwarden, The Netherlands;4. Post Graduate School of Medicine, University Medical Center Groningen, University of Groningen, The Netherlands;5. University of Technology Delft, Industrial Design Engineering, The Netherlands |
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| Abstract: | Previous work has demonstrated the potential for coordinated control of a group of generators in a generation market, with the goal of destabilizing other machines in the system, while maintaining (nearly) completely satisfactory performance within this control group. Such action would clearly achieve an anti-competitive objective, and might be attractive strategic behavior if the entities involved believed it would go undetected. The work here examines the degree to which, among all competing generators, a subset may be specifically `targeted' to experience instability. It refines the earlier design technique to demonstrate that anti-competitive control can indeed selectively target competing generators. This form of strategic behavior will be termed `predatory control.' The results presented suggest that the risk of predatory control is more severe than earlier analysis might have suggested, and provides a cautionary note to indicate that entities responsible for system security must have tools to guard against such behavior. |
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