政府补贴下考虑持股合作战略的供应链减排动态协调方法

在政府补贴政策下,将持股合作战略引入供应链减排决策中,运用微分博弈理论研究供应链的最优决策和动态协调问题.构建集中式决策模型和持股合作前后的分散式决策模型,并分析持股比例和消费者低碳偏好对供应链最优决策、利润和政府补贴政策的影响.研究结果表明:持股合作战略会替代一部分政府补贴政策的作用,且供应链成员合作越密切,政府补贴效果越好.随着持股比例的增加,供应链总利润呈现“U”型变化,只有当持股比例满足一定条件时,供应链成员才愿意选择持股合作,且持股合作战略的实施能够实现供应链协调.消费者低碳偏好的提高会对企业减排产生激励作用,而政府作为政策的制定者不受消费者低碳偏好的影响.

Research on dynamic coordination of supply chain emission reduction considering shareholding cooperation strategy under government subsidy

Under the government subsidy policy, this paper introduces shareholding cooperation strategy into the supply chain emission reduction decision, and applies differential game theory to study the optimal decision and dynamic coordination of the supply chain. A centralised decision model and a decentralised decision model before and after the shareholding partnership are constructed, and the effects of the shareholding ratio and consumers'' low-carbon preferences on the optimal decision, profit and government subsidy policy are analysed. The results of the study show that the shareholding strategy replaces part of the government subsidy policy, and the closer the supply chain members cooperate, the more effective the government subsidy is. As the shareholding ratio increases, the total profit of the supply chain changes in a “U” shape, and only when the shareholding ratio meets certain conditions are supply chain members willing to choose shareholding cooperation, and the implementation of shareholding cooperation strategy can achieve supply chain coordination. The government, as the policy maker, is not influenced by consumers'' preference for low carbon emissions.