信息不对称下多供应商与单零售商的退货策略

研究由多个提供互补组件的供应商和一个组装商组成的报童型供应链中，零售商将需求信息私有化时，供应商如何制定克服信息不对称的退货策略，使得零售商订货量和信息对称情况下供应链最优订货量相等。假设需求分高需求和低需求两种状态，供应商在需求状态未知的情况下给出针对不同需求状态的两个子契约，使得零售商按照实际需求状态而确定相应订货量。首先分析集权型供应链中整个供应链的最优订货量，再分析分权型供应链中零售商的订货决策，进一步分析信息不对称情况下供应商间的博弈及批发价和回收价契约参数的确定方法。通过算例，说明激励零售商按照真实需求状态选择子契约的合理性，供应商制定的退货策略可以克服信息不对称。

Research on Return Policy of Multi-Suppliers and Single-Retailer under Asymmetric Information

A study is conducted on a newsvendor supply chain composed of multi-suppliers and one assembler who also acts as retailer and possesses private demand information. The suppliers provide return policies to overcome information asymmetry so as to make the retailers order equal to the optimal order obtained by a supply chain with symmetric information. It is assumed that demands can be described by two states: high and low demand ones. Thus, the suppliers should offer two sub-contracts with respect to the two different demand states without knowing demand information, while the retailer should make order decision based on the actual demand state. Then, the optimal order is analyzed under both centralized and decentralized supply chain. Further, the game behavior between different suppliers is also analyzed for the setting of the wholesale price and buyback price. Numerical example shows that incentive is a reasonable way to make the retailer choose a sub contract based on actual demand state and the suppliers return polices can overcome the information asymmetry.