| Abstract: | Traditionally, metaphors such as "my job is a jail" have been treated as implicit similes (i.e., this metaphor would be treated as if it were a comparison statement, "my job is like a jail"). A. Tversky's (1977) account of similarity is applied to such nonliteral similarity expressions, and is shown to apply as readily to nonliteral comparisons as to literal comparisons. But treating metaphors as comparison statements fails to account for certain important phenomena, including metaphoricity itself (the judgment that a comparison statement is nonliteral). We argue that metaphors are exactly what they appear to be: class-inclusion assertions, in which the topic of the metaphor (e.g., "my job") is assigned to a diagnostic category (e.g., entities that confine one against one's will, are unpleasant, are difficult to escape from). In such assertions, the metaphor vehicle (e.g., "jail") refers to that category, and at the same time is a prototypical exemplar of that category. This account of metaphor provides a basis for a theory of metaphor comprehension, and also clarifies why people use metaphors instead of similes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved) |
