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我国民航业限制降价措施的博弈均衡分析
引用本文:孙文建.我国民航业限制降价措施的博弈均衡分析[J].南京建筑工程学院学报,2002(2):38-42.
作者姓名:孙文建
作者单位:南京工业大学管理科学与工程学院 江苏南京210009
摘    要:由于民航业供给缺乏弹性特点,在面临需求下降时,民航企业的降价在所难免,而且分散化经营使得降价压力更大。限制降价措施在机票代理制下只会改变各民航企业的竞争行为--由价格竞争转化为给代理商的折扣竞争,限制降价措施产生的效果只是改变了民航企业与代理商之间的利益分配,无利于民航业自身利益和社会福利的增加。

关 键 词:民航业  博弈均衡分析  机票代理  纳什均衡  中国

Game-equilibrium Analysis of the China's Civil Aviation industry under the Limit-depreciating measures
SUN Wen-jian.Game-equilibrium Analysis of the China's Civil Aviation industry under the Limit-depreciating measures[J].Journal of Nanjing Architectural and Civil Engineering Institute(Natural Science),2002(2):38-42.
Authors:SUN Wen-jian
Abstract:Because the supply of the civil aviation industry is lack of flexibility,it is difficult for airline companies to avoid depreciating when the demand for the civil aviation industry falls.And the dispersive management brings on more depreciating pressure.Under the ticket-agent system,the measures which limits airline companies depreciating (for short "limit-depreciating measures") changes nothing but their competition behaviors-from depreciation for consumers to discount for agent,and only induces the profit reallocation between agents and airline companies.The limit-depreciating measures can't increase the profit of the civil aviation industry and social welfare as well.
Keywords:limit-depreiating  nash-equilibrium  airline tieket agent system  consumer-surplus  social welfare  
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