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珠宝首饰市场信息不对称分析及对策研究
引用本文:罗攀,丘志力. 珠宝首饰市场信息不对称分析及对策研究[J]. 宝石和宝石学杂志, 2004, 6(1): 4-8
作者姓名:罗攀  丘志力
作者单位:中山大学地球科学系,广东,广州,510275
摘    要:珠宝首饰市场是典型的信息极不对称市场, 信息不对称幅度呈波动性增长, 市场机制对信息不对称极为敏感. 信息不对称会引起逆向选择和消费者搜寻成本增大, 从而抑制珠宝首饰的消费需求, 最终导致市场失灵. 分析表明, 加强信号显示和引入适度市场规制可以减少信息不对称对珠宝首饰市场发展的影响, 提高市场效率.

关 键 词:珠宝首饰市场  信息不对称  逆向选择  搜寻成本  信号显示  市场规制  珠宝首饰市场  信息不对称分析  对策  研究  Countermeasure  Market  Information Asymmetry  市场效率  影响  发展  市场规制  信号显示  加强  分析表  市场失灵  消费需求  搜寻成本  消费者  逆向选择  敏感
文章编号:1008-214X(2004)01-0004-05
修稿时间:2003-11-27

Analysis on Information Asymmetry of Jewelry Market and Countermeasure
LUO Pan,QIU Zhi-li. Analysis on Information Asymmetry of Jewelry Market and Countermeasure[J]. Journal of Gems & Gemmology, 2004, 6(1): 4-8
Authors:LUO Pan  QIU Zhi-li
Abstract:Jewelry market is a market of extreme asymmetric information. The amplitude of information asymmetry increases fluctuantly. The market mechanism is sensitive to the asymmetric information. The information asymmetry may result in the adverse selection and the increase in the cost of consumer search, which would restrain the consumption demand for jewelry, and finally induce the ineffectiveness of market regulation. It can be concluded that the effect of information asymmetry upon the development of jewelry market can be relieved by reinforcing the signaling and the market regulation, so as to increase the market efficiency.
Keywords:jewelry market  information asymmetry  adverse selection  cost of search  signaling  market regulation
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