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Formalizing provable anonymity in Isabelle/HOL |
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| Authors: | |
| Affiliation: | 1.State Key Laboratory of Computer Science, Institute of Software,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing,China;2.College of Information Engineering,Capital Normal University,Beijing,China;3.Computer Science and Communications, Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication,University of Luxembourg,Walferdange,Luxembourg;4.Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust,University of Luxembourg,Walferdange,Luxembourg |
| Abstract: | We formalize in a theorem prover the notion of provable anonymity. Our formalization relies on inductive definitions of message distinguishing ability and observational equivalence on traces observed by the intruder. Our theory differs from its original proposal and essentially boils down to the inductive definition of distinguishing messages with respect to a knowledge set for the intruder. We build our theory in Isabelle/HOL to achieve a mechanical framework for the analysis of anonymity protocols. Its feasibility is illustrated through two case studies of the Crowds and Onion Routing protocols. |
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