股权结构、监控机制与治理效率分析

我国上市公司股权结构的弊端集中体现在国家股“一股独大“且未能流通,使股权结构呈现畸形分布.由于股权集中在有效持股主体缺位、行政色彩浓厚的国家股股东手中,造成董事会人选不合理,董事会运作被“内部人“所操纵,丧失其独立性,缺乏有效监控的动力,公司治理的内部和外部监控机制都难以发挥作用.为了提高我国上市公司整体治理效率,必须对上市公司的股权结构进行重构,促进内部和外部监控机制有效运作.

AN ANALYSIS OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND MONITORING MECHANISM AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EFFICIENCY

The defect of ownership structure of our listed companies is "one dominating stock" and unfreely circulating state-owned shares that cause the ownership structure of listed companies to produce irrational distribution. Because of the absence of state-owned principal ownership in state-owned holders and the strong political color of the shareholders, it caused the irrationality of personnel appointment of the board and the status quo of insider-controlling in the board; thus, the board of directors which is inadequate of its due independence lacks the motive for efficient monitoring, All of the above make it difficult for interior monitoring mechanism to play its role. According to the analysis of exterior monitoring mechanism, the absence of state-owned principal ownership and irrational stockholders equity structure cause the phenomenon of insider control which make exterior monitor mechanism difficult to perform its monitoring function. To solve the problem of low-efficiency of integrated governance in our listed companies, we first should perfect the irrational stockholders equity structure to improve the efficient operation of listed company's governance mechanism.