Security Against Hardware Trojan Attacks Using Key-Based Design Obfuscation |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Rajat?Subhra?ChakrabortyEmail author Swarup?Bhunia |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, West Bengal, 721302, India;(2) Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA |
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Abstract: | Malicious modification of hardware in untrusted fabrication facilities, referred to as hardware Trojan, has emerged as a major security concern. Comprehensive detection of these Trojans during post-manufacturing test has been
shown to be extremely difficult. Hence, it is important to develop design techniques that provide effective countermeasures
against hardware Trojans by either preventing Trojan attacks or facilitating detection during test. Obfuscation is a technique that is conventionally employed to prevent piracy of software and hardware intellectual property (IP). In
this work, we propose a novel application of key-based circuit structure and functionality obfuscation to achieve protection
against hardware Trojans triggered by rare internal circuit conditions. The proposed obfuscation scheme is based on judicious
modification of the state transition function, which creates two distinct functional modes: normal and obfuscated. A circuit transitions from the obfuscated to the normal mode only upon application of a specific input sequence, which defines
the key. We show that it provides security against Trojan attacks in two ways: (1) it makes some inserted Trojans benign,
i.e. they become effective only in the obfuscated mode; and (2) it prevents an adversary from exploiting the true rare events
in a circuit to insert hard-to-detect Trojans. The proposed design methodology can thus achieve simultaneous protection from
hardware Trojans and hardware IP piracy. Besides protecting ICs against Trojan attacks in foundry, we show that it can also
protect against malicious modifications by untrusted computer-aided design (CAD) tools in both SoC and FPGA design flows.
Simulation results for a set of benchmark circuits show that the scheme is capable of achieving high levels of security against
Trojan attacks at modest area, power and delay overhead. |
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