| 供应链合作中的激励机制设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈畴镛,林士俊.供应链合作中的激励机制设计[J].杭州电子科技大学学报,2005,25(5):1-5. |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈畴镛 林士俊 |
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| 作者单位： | 杭州电子科技大学管理学院,浙江,杭州,310018 |
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| 基金项目： | 浙江省自然科学基金项目（M703020） |
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| 摘 要： | 供应链联盟是供应链合作的重要方式,其内部存在着委托代理关系.为达成联盟既定目标,盟主企业（委托方）必须根据盟员企业（代理方）的需要,制定适当的行为规范和分配制度,激发其积极性,以达到联盟组织利益和盟员企业个体利益的一致.该文基于委托代理理论, 构建了供应链联盟激励机制模型,探讨了供应链联盟利润分配合同的优化设计问题,以期为供应链联盟的激励实践提供参考.
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| 关 键 词： | 供应链联盟 委托代理关系 激励机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-9146（2005）05-0001-05 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-05-10 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年5月10日 |
An Incentive Mechanism Design for Supply Chain Collaboration |
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| CHEN Chou-yong,LIN Shi-jun.An Incentive Mechanism Design for Supply Chain Collaboration[J].Journal of Hangzhou Dianzi University,2005,25(5):1-5. |
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| Authors: | CHEN Chou-yong LIN Shi-jun |
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| Affiliation: | School of Management, Hangzhou Dianzi University, Hangzhou Zhejiang 310018, China |
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| Abstract: | supply chain alliance is an important mode of supply chain collaboration,with the principal-agent relationship within it.In order to achieve the goal of the alliance,motivate and balance the interest of the members,it is supposed that the chief enterprise(contractor) considers the requirements of the members(subcontractors) and then sets down proper rules and regulations.Based on the principal-agent theory,this paper constructs a model of incentive mechanism of supply chain alliance,discussing about how to optimize the design of distributing profit contract.This paper hopes to offer some reference for the practice of incentive in the supply chain alliance. |
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| Keywords: | supply chain alliance principal- agent relationship incentive mechanism |
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