| 循环经济激励机制设计研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 郭彬,张世英,郭焱,冷永刚. 循环经济激励机制设计研究[J]. 工业工程, 2005, 8(6): 56-59 |
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| 作者姓名： | 郭彬 张世英 郭焱 冷永刚 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072;天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072;山东工商学院,山东,烟台,264005;山东工商学院,山东,烟台,264005 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目（70471050） |
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| 摘 要： | 为帮助政府解决企业在生产过程中既注重自身的经济效益,又注重长期的生态效益的问题,采用信息经济学中的委托-代理研究方法,设计一套激励机制来激励和约束企业的行为,引导企业发展循环经济.通过理论分析,认为政府应按照企业所属的产业类型、企业任务的相关性以及企业努力结果的不确定性设计不同的激励机制.
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| 关 键 词： | 循环经济 委托代理 道德风险 最优激励机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-7375(2005)06-0056-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2004-11-15 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-11-15 |
Incentive Mechanisms for Circular Economy |
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| GUO Bin,ZHANG Shi-ying,GUO Yan,LENG Yong-gang. Incentive Mechanisms for Circular Economy[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2005, 8(6): 56-59 |
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| Authors: | GUO Bin ZHANG Shi-ying GUO Yan LENG Yong-gang |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Management, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China; 2. Shandong Institute of Business and Technology, Yantai 264005, China |
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| Abstract: | In the process of production,enterprises should pay attention not only to their own profits,but also to long-term ecological benefits.Principal-agent methods from information economics are employed to design a set of incentive mechanisms to improve enterprises'behaviors,so as to lead the enterprises to develop circular economy.It is concluded that governments should provide different incentive mechanism for enterprises based upon their industrial types,task correlation,and the uncertainty of effort outcomes. |
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| Keywords: | circular economy principal-agent moral hazard optimal incentive mechanism |
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