企业技术创新的政府激励机制设计

运用信息经济学中委托代理理论与模型，定量分析了政府对企业技术创新的激励问题，首先探讨了在企业努力水平可观测与不可观测两种条件下政府的最优激励机制，其次，论证了在信息不对称情况下，引入参照变量可以降低外生因素的不确定性，减少代理成本，从而提高政府的激励效率，最后依据上述不同条件下得到的政府最优激励模型提出了对策与建议。

Design on Government Incentive Mechanism to Technological Innovation

This paper analyses the problem on government incentive mechanism to enterprise's technological innovation by means of the theory of principal-agent. First the paper discusses the government incentive mech-anism under two different conditions. The first condition is the level of firm's effort is observable, the second is firm's effort is unobservable. Then the paper proves consultation variables can reduce uncertainty of factors outside, decrease agent cost and thereby improve government incentive efficiency if information is asymmetry. At last the paper puts forwards some suggestions according to the three conditions respectively.