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| 多对一供应链零售商驱动型收入共享契约下的生产决策 | |
| 引用本文： | 周小明,朱云龙,朱珠,申海.多对一供应链零售商驱动型收入共享契约下的生产决策[J].控制与决策,2009,24(9). |
| 作者姓名： | 周小明 朱云龙 朱珠 申海 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 中国科学院沈阳自动化研究所,沈阳,110016;中国科学院工业信息学重点实验室,沈阳,110016;中国科学院研究生院,北京,100039;辽宁省电力有限公司,信息通信分公司,沈阳,110006 2. 中国科学院沈阳自动化研究所,沈阳,110016,中国科学院工业信息学重点实验室,沈阳,110016 3. 中国科学院沈阳自动化研究所,沈阳,110016,中国科学院工业信息学重点实验室,沈阳,110016;中国科学院研究生院,北京100039 |
| 基金项目： | 国家科技计划项目(2007AA04Z189) |
| 摘 要： | 针对多对一供应链结构中零售商具有较强议价能力的特点，建立了零售商为主方、制造商为从方的Ｓｔａｃｋｅｌｂｅｒｇ主从对策模型；给出在零售商提供契约条款的对称博弈中，制造商生产产品策略存在唯一最优解的证明；分析了零售商契约参数变量的决策问题；讨论了收入共享契约下分散供应链同集中供应链决策的关系．通过仿真实验，分析验证了契约参数及产品的可替代性对供应链绩效的影响． |
| 关 键 词： | Sｔａｃｋｅｌｂｅｒｇ主从对策 多对一供应链 收入共享契约 生产决策 |
| 收稿时间： | 2008-10-20 |
| 修稿时间： | 2009-3-20 |
Production decision based on retailer-driven revenue-sharing contracts under many-to-one supply chain structure |
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| ZHOU Xiao-ming,ZHU Yun-long,ZHU Zhu,SHEN Hai.Production decision based on retailer-driven revenue-sharing contracts under many-to-one supply chain structure[J].Control and Decision,2009,24(9). | |
| Authors: | ZHOU Xiao-ming ZHU Yun-long ZHU Zhu SHEN Hai |
| Affiliation: | 1a.Key Laboratory of Industrial Informatics;1b.Shenyang Institute of Automation;Chinese Academy of Sciences;Shenyang 110016;China;2.Graduate School;Beijing 100039;3.Information and Communication Brach;Liaoning Electric Power Company Limited;Shenyang 110006;China. |
| Abstract: | Based on the characteristic that the retailer has stronger bargaining power under the many-to-one supply chain structure,the Stackelberg game model where the retailer is a leader and the manufacturers are followers,is established.Then,proofs for the game between manufacturers' producing strategies where a unique optimal symmetric Nash equilibrium exists are provided.Parameter decisions on the retailer's contracts are analyzed.The relationship of decisions between decentralized and centralized supply chain u... |
| Keywords: | Stackelberg game Many-to-one supply chain Revenue-sharing contract Production decision |
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