分时电价下基于供用电双方博弈的家庭用户需求响应

动态电价策略正成为当前电力市场环境下供电侧普遍采用的调控手段,针对电力市场中售电公司与用户间互动关系,基于博弈论构建一种非合作的Stackelberg模型研究家庭用户的需求响应策略。模型通过对用户进行分类以实现对不同偏好用户的综合考虑,同时将电网负荷波动对售电公司效益的影响、用户满意度对用电舒适度的影响进行量化处理以完善供、用电双方效用函数。采用逆向归纳法对模型的纳什均衡解进行求解,并以此实现分时电价下对用户用电任务的优化调整。最后,将模型应用于实际算例中并对用户种类进行灵敏度分析,结果表明模型在供用电双方的效用优化方面具有较好的效果。

Demand Response of Household Users Based on Game between Power Supply and Consumption Side under Time-of-Use Price

The dynamic pricing strategy is becoming the generally used regulating means by supply side in the current electricity market. Considering the interactive relationship between retailers and users in the electricity market, a non-cooperative Stackelberg model based on game theory is constructed to study the demand response strategy of household users. The model classifies users to achieve comprehensive consideration of users with different preferences. Meanwhile, the impact of load fluctuations on retailers’ benefits and the effect of users’ satisfaction on the comfort are quantified to improve the utility function on both power supply and consumption side. The backward induction is adopted to solve the Nash equilibrium of the model, and in this way the optimal adjustment of the electricity services under time-of-use price can be realized. Finally, the model is applied to the practical example and the sensitivity of the user category is analyzed. The results show the proposed model has better effect on utility optimization between power supply and consumption side.