现货市场环境下售电商激励型需求响应优化策略

需求响应是售电商应对现货市场风险的重要工具,但已有研究中的售电商均采取电价型需求响应策略,无法根据变化的实际情况灵活实施需求响应,缺乏关于激励型需求响应的深入研究。针对此,构建了单一售电商与多个用户之间的激励型需求响应主从博弈模型,其中售电商在现货市场电价高于售电价格的时段,制定需求响应补贴策略以减少其售电损失,而用户根据售电商制定的补贴价格决定相应时段的响应量以获取额外收益。通过分析给出了博弈模型的求解方法,算例表明,售电商及用户均可通过需求响应而获益。此外,文中分析了现货市场价格波动对售电商的补贴价格制定、用户响应量和各自需求响应收益的影响以及不同类型的用户加入需求响应项目时对售电商需求响应收益的影响。

Optimization Strategy of Incentive Based Demand Response for Electricity Retailer in Spot Market Environment

Demand response is an important tool for the electricity retailer to manage risk in spot market. However, in previous studies, electricity retailers mostly adopt price-based demand response strategies, which cannot flexibly implement demand response according to the changing practical situation. The incentive-based demand response is lack of in-depth research. In this paper, a Stackelberg game model for the incentive-based demand response between a single electricity retailer and multiple users is established. In this model, the electricity retailer reduces the loss of electricity sales by formulating demand response subsidy strategies during the periods when the electricity price in spot market is higher than its selling price. In the corresponding period, users decide the response electricity quantity according to the subsidy price set by the electricity retailer to obtain additional profits. Moreover, the solution of game equilibrium is presented by analysis. A case study shows that electricity retailer and users can all benefit from the demand response. In addition, the influence of price fluctuations in spot market on the subsidy price of the electricity retailer, response electricity quantity of users and respective profits of each participant, as well as the impact of various users joining in demand response projects on the profits of the electricity retailer are analyzed.