Stealth modification versus nuisance attacks in the LOCKSS peer-to-peer digital preservation system |
| |
Authors: | Mema Roussopoulos Prashanth Bungale |
| |
Affiliation: | (1) Department of Informatics and Telecommunications, University of Athens, Athens, 15771, Greece;(2) School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA |
| |
Abstract: | The LOCKSS system is a world-wide peer-to-peer system for the preservation of academic journals and other archival information
published on the Web. The system is deployed at over 200 libraries around the world and currently preserving titles of publishers
representing more than 2000 academic titles. It consists of a large number of independent, low-cost, persistent Web caches
that cooperate to detect and repair damage to their content by voting in “opinion polls.” Based on our experience working
with the LOCKSS system, in this paper, we identify and characterize a fundamental tradeoff in the system’s ability to defend
against adversaries with competing goals. In particular, the techniques used to defend against adversaries attempting stealth
modification of content being preserved in the system are at odds with those used to identify nuisance adversaries simply
trying to disrupt system procedures. We show that with a simple change to the design of the system’s preservation protocol
we are able to create moderately strong defense against both of these competing adversaries simultaneously. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|