考虑建设质量决策的交通类 BOT 项目合同设计研究

假设政府部门和私营企业以BOT（Build-Operate-Transfer，建设-运营-移交）模式合作建设一个新的交通项目，建立一个多阶段博弈模型研究了交通类BOT 项目合同设计问题，考虑了4 个重要的决策变量:特许经营期长度、服务价格、建设质量和项目能力（或容量）。通过逆向求解法得到了BOT 项目合同设计的最优解，分析了特许期的长度对私营企业和政府部门的最优收费价格及交通项目最优建设质量的影响。分别从社会福利最大化和私营企业利润最大化的角度得出了最优的特许期长度，并对模型进行了拓展，研究了交通拥堵状况对交通类BOT 项目合同设计的影响。

Transport BOT Project Contract Design ConsideringConstruction Quality Decision

The government sector and the private firm are assumed to build a new transport project through the Build–Operate–Transfer（BOT）mode. We develop a multi-stage game-theoretical model to investigate the transport BOT project contract designproblem containing four critical decision variables:the length of the concession period，service charge，construction quality, andproject capacity. Firstly，we obtain the optimal solutions for BOT project contract design through the backward induction method.Secondly，we analyze the influence of the length of the concession period on the optimal charge of both the government sector andthe private enterprise and the optimal construction quality of transport projects. Thirdly，we derive the optimal length of theconcession period from the perspective of the social welfare and the private firm’s maximization，respectively. Finally，we extend thebasic model to examine the impact of traffic congestion in the transport project on the transport BOT project contract design.