Uncertain Shapley value of coalitional game with application to supply chain alliance |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Information, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China;2. Department of Mathematical Sciences, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China;1. Khalifa University of Science, Technology and Research, P.O. Box 127788, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates;2. Etisalat BT Innovation Center, P.O. Box 127788, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates;1. The University of Western Australia, Department of Mathematics and Statistics, 35 Stirling Highway, Crawley, WA 6009, Australia;2. The University of Western Australia, School of Population and Global Health, 35 Stirling Highway, Crawley, WA 6009, Australia;1. Department of Mathematics, Dibrugarh University, Dibrugarh 786004, India;2. Slovak University of Technology, Department of Mathematics, Radlinského 11, 81368 Bratislava, Slovakia;3. Institute of Theory of Information and Automation, Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic |
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| Abstract: | Uncertain coalitional game deals with situations in which the transferable payoffs are uncertain variables. The uncertain core has been proposed as the solution of uncertain coalitional game. This paper goes further by presenting two definitions of uncertain Shapley value: expected Shapley value and α-optimistic Shapley value. Meanwhile, some characterizations of the uncertain Shapley value are investigated. Finally, as an application, uncertain Shapley value is used to solve a profit allocation problem of supply chain alliance. |
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| Keywords: | Coalitional game Uncertain payoff Shapley value Supply chain alliance |
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