基于比特承诺的计算安全量子密码协议

比特承诺是重要的密码学元素，在复杂密码协议设计(如：零知识证明)中扮演着重要角色.Mayers，Lo和Chau分别独立证明了所有无条件安全的量子比特承诺方案都是不安全的，即著名的Mayers-Lo-Chau不可行定理.但这并不排除存在计算安全的量子比特承诺.2000年，Dumais等人给出了一个基于计算假设的量子单向置换可以用于构造计算安全的比特承诺方案.利用纠错码的方法，把量子比特承诺扩展成量子多比特承诺方案，并证明了所给方案的隐蔽性质和约束性质.以比特承诺方案为基础，给出了量子数字签名和量子加密认证方案的设计方法, 并给出了协议的安全性证明.

Founding Computationally Secure Quantum Cryptography Protocols Based on Bit Commitment

Bit commitment is an important primitive in modern cryptography and plays a crucial role in complex cryptography protocol (such as zero knowledge proof) design. Mayers,Lo and Chau independently proved that all the existing quantum bit commitment (QBC) schemes are insecure. This result is the famous Mayers-Lo-Chau no-go theorem on QBC. However, this doesn't exclude that there exists computationally secure QBC. In Eurocrypt 2000, Dumais, et al. claimed that computationally secure QBC scheme can be constructed based on any quantum one-way permutations. Utilizing error correcting codes, the quantum bit commitment is extended to quantum multi-bit commitment and it is shown that this proposed scheme has perfect concealing and computational binding properties. Methods to design quantum digital signature and authenticated encryption scheme are proposed based on QBC. Security analysis shows that the proposed protocols are secure.