Creating a level playing field? The concentration and centralisation of emissions in the European Union Emissions Trading System

This article questions the assumption that carbon markets create a level playing field by exploring the relationship between the organisation of capital and the organisation of emissions in the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). It constructs a database by matching installations and owners to reveal that a relatively small number of large-scale coal-fired power stations, owned by a very small group of states and corporations, are responsible for a significant proportion of greenhouse gas emissions. The findings are analysed by considering how technological dependence on coal together with the corporate institutional form combine to support the socio-spatial concentration and centralisation of capital and emissions. Case studies of the consolidation of the seven largest polluting owners from Europe's coal-dependent electricity sector and the carbon trading strategies of the two largest polluters, RWE and E.ON, then assess the impacts of energy liberalisation and emissions trading policies. The article concludes that EU energy and climate policies are pulling in different directions by clustering responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions and diffusing responsibility to address climate change. The uneven distribution of emissions within the EU ETS makes an alternative policy approach that directly targets the biggest corporate and state polluters both feasible and necessary.