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发电商演化博弈过程中的创新行为仿真研究
引用本文:刘贞,任玉珑. 发电商演化博弈过程中的创新行为仿真研究[J]. 工业工程, 2007, 10(4): 59-63,86
作者姓名:刘贞  任玉珑
作者单位:重庆大学,经济与工商管理学院,重庆,400030
摘    要:为了研究自主创新行为、模仿创新行为对发电市场结构的影响,提出一种基于Swarm的多主体演化博弈仿真模型.模型将相同境况的发电商视为一个群体,从群体角度来看,发电商是以一定的概率选择正常经营、自主创新或模仿创新.通过仿真发现,在满足一定条件下,发电市场中进行自主创新发电商的比例以及市场结构演化具有稳定性.市场机制对于发电商创新行为以及发电市场结构的演化起至关重要的作用.仿真结果为政府制定创新策略提供了依据.

关 键 词:发电市场  不完全信息  演化博弈  Swarm仿真
文章编号:1007-7375(2007)04-0059-05
修稿时间:2006-03-06

Simulation Study on Innovation Behavior in the Process of Power Supplier''''s Evolutionary Game
LIU Zhen,REN Yu-long. Simulation Study on Innovation Behavior in the Process of Power Supplier''''s Evolutionary Game[J]. Industrial Engineering Journal, 2007, 10(4): 59-63,86
Authors:LIU Zhen  REN Yu-long
Affiliation:College of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400030, China
Abstract:The evolutionary game simulation model based on Swarm is presented and applied to studying the effect of independent innovation behavior and imitation innovation behavior on the electricity market structure. The model regards the latent competitors as a colony. From the point of the colony, power suppliers choose independent innovation or imitation innovation strategy in a probability. Some results are showed by simulation. Under certain conditions, both the proportion of power suppliers innovating independently and the market structure will be evolutionarily stable. By macro adjusting, the quit mechanism plays an important role in independent innovation of power supplier and evolution of generator market structure. The result of the simulation model provides basis for government to make decisions.
Keywords:power market   incomplete information    evolutionary game    Swarm simulation
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